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In this paper, we analyze a market with salient-thinking consumers
who have different willingness-to-pay for a unit quality of the good.
Specifically, we use a utility function recently introduced by Bor-
dalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013b) to model the salient-thinking
consumers. In the first part of the paper, we solve the screening
problem of a monopolist facing such consumers. We find that opti-
mal screening results in a market where price is salient rather than
quality with or without asymmetric information on the consumers’
types. In the second part, we allow the monopolist to offer bun-
dles – ‘decoy bundles’ – not really intended to sell, but to attract
the consumers to some target bundles that the monopolist does in-
tend to sell. This is possible because the consumer’s utility depends
on the offered menu, or the context, itself and thus the monopo-
list has an option to add such bundles if profitable. We find that
the seller has an incentive to add decoy bundles to make the target
bundles quality-salient so that she can extract more profit from the
consumers. Doing so results in welfare loss on the consumers’ side.
The first half and the second half combined provide a characteriza-
tion of the monopolist’s problem in a market with salient-thinking
consumers.
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pricing, quality differentiation
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1 Introduction
There is abundant evidence showing that the consumers’ choice depend not
merely on the attributes of a given good but also on the context in which
the choice is made. For example, a great number of literature stemming
from Huber, Payne, and Puto (1992) provide evidence on the effect of
asymmetrically dominated alternatives. That is, suppose there are two
goods and that neither good dominates the other. However, adding an
alternative dominated by one of the goods but not by the other enhances
greatly the sales of the dominating good. Another well-known example is
that of Tversky and Simonson (1993), extremeness aversion, which says
that consumers are reluctant to choose extreme options. In a market with
two alternatives, one with low price, low quality and another with high
price, high quality, introducing an additional alternative with extremely
high price and quality will boost the sale of the good with high price
and quality since now the good seems ‘moderate.’ Chatterjee and Heath
(1995) also provide a large number examples on such context-dependent
consumer choice.
In all such examples, there exists a product that does not sell – we
call this a decoy product1 (or decoy bundle) – and/or a product whose
sale fall due to the arrival of a new alternative. Hence, it is ambiguous
whether exploiting consumers’ such behavior is indeed profitable to the
seller. However, most of the literature has concentrated on analyzing the
1While many use this term referring to the dominated good in the asymmetrically
dominated alternative context, in its wide sense it refers to any good that boosts the
sale of some other alternative though the good itself does not sell much, if any. See
Chatterjee and Heath (1995).
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effect on the consumers’ side and there has been no formal analysis of
such sales’ practice that focus on the firms’ side. This was partly due to
the lack of reasonable and tractable model of consumer preference that is
consistent with such context-dependent behavior of the consumers. How-
ever, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013b, hereafter BGS) proposed a
model of consumer preference that reflects the salient-thinking behavior;
a specific form of context-dependent behavior of the consumers. We adopt
this model to analyze the behavior of a firm selling its product to a pool
of consumers that make different choices depending on the context they
face.
Of course, BGS is not the first to propose a tractable utility function
that incorporates context-dependent behaviors. Depending on how we
set the reference point, the reference-dependent preference of Koszegi and
Rabin (2006) also incorporate context-dependent behaviors, and numer-
ous research has built on such preference to explain many aspects of the
economy that was not possible with only rational preferences. However,
the utility function of BGS takes into account the effect of the bundles
offered in the market more explicitly, and therefore is more appropriate
for analyzing the effect of decoy bundles.
Using the BGS utility function, we first solve the typical screening
problem (not allowing decoy bundles) the monopolist faces when encoun-
tered with two types of (heterogeneous) consumers. We find that the mo-
nopolist must offer a price-salient menu to successfully screen the salient-
thinking consumers in both situations with and without asymmetric infor-
mation on the consumer type. Then, we turn our attention to a relatively
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new screening problem2 where we allow for decoy bundles. We find that
the monopolist sells quality-salient bundles to the consumers so that they
can charge a higher price from them, which results in higher profit for
the seller and lower surplus for the consumer compared to when there
is no decoy bundle. We also find that the presence of decoy bundle has
a greater impact on producer/consumer surplus as consumer are more
salient-thinking. Additionally, we compare the profit increment from de-
coys with the profit loss due to information asymmetry so that we can
determine how well the firm performs if decoy bundles are allowed under
unfavorable conditions concerning information.
In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we consider the
standard screening problem under such salient-thinking consumers. In
Section 4, we consider the possibility of attracting consumers using bundles
not intended to sell but to attract other bundles, namely decoy bundles.
Section 5 concludes with some discussions.
2 The Model
Let M be the set of bundles, i.e. the menu. A bundle (q, p) ∈ M is
composed of quality3, q, and price, p. We assume that consumers exclude
dominated bundles from their choice sets. This amounts to assuming that
if (q1, p1) and (q2, p2) are in M, then p1 > p2 if and only if q1 > q2. Also,
2Similar research has been conducted based on the reference-dependent preferences
of Koszegi and Rabin (2006). For example, Carbajal and Ely (2012) solves optimal
contract problem between a monopolist and a continuum of loss-averse buyers; Hahn et
al. (2012) solves the screening problem under loss-averse consumers; and Rosato (2013)
suggests a model where the seller sells substitute goods to loss-averse consumers.
3Another possible interpretation is to see q as quantity rather than quality.
3
assume |M| <∞ and writeM = {(q1, p1), . . . , (qM , pM )}. We assume that
consumer’s preference depends on the salience of price and quality. We
use a utility function proposed by Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013,











δ+1p if σ(q, q̄) < σ(p, p̄)
q − p if σ(q, q̄) = σ(p, p̄)
,
where σ(·, ·) : R+ × R+ → R+, namely the salience function, is a func-
tion that satisfies a couple of conditions so that it appropriately measures
salience and δ ∈ (0, 1] decreases in the severity of salient thinking. Fol-
lowing BGS, we assume that the salience function satisfies 1) the ordering
property and 2) homogeneity of degree zero. The ordering property indi-
cates that if the value of an attribute of a bundle differs more from the
average, the attribute becomes more salient. Homogeneity of degree zero
implies that salience does not depend solely on the absolute difference
from the average. For instance, if the prices of all bundles in a menu rise
at the same rate, no difference is caused in terms of the salience of price.






which was also introduced by BGS. To evaluate the relative salience of
price and quality for a given bundle (q, p), we compare σ(q, q̄) with σ(p, p̄)
where q̄ and p̄ are the arithmetic means of q and p, respectively.
We slightly modify this utility function in two aspects; 1) we add a
parameter to incorporate different willingness-to-pay (WTP) among con-
sumers and 2) introduce a valuation function of quality, v(q), instead of
using q itself so that the utility function can feature general characteristics
of a typical utility function with respect to the quality. Here v(q) can be











δ+1p if σ(v(q), v(q)) < σ(p, p̄)
θv(q)− p if σ(v(q), v(q)) = σ(p, p̄)
.(1)
Here, θ captures the consumer’s WTP and v(·) is a twice differentiable
function satisfying v(0) = 0, v′(·) > 0, v′′(·) < 0, limq→0 v′(q) = ∞, and
limq→∞ v
′(q) = 0. If σ(p, p̄) > σ(v(q), v(q)) 4, we say the bundle (q, p) is
price-salient; if the inequality holds in the other direction, we say that
the bundle is quality-salient. If σ(p, p̄) = σ(v(q), v(q)), we say that the
bundles is equally salient. To take the notations simple we write v̄ instead
of v(q) throughout the paper. Absent salient thinking, the utility function
4Given that v(q) is the perceived quality, it seems more reasonable that consumers are
interested in the salience with respect to the average perceived quality v(q) rather than
the perceived average quality v(q̄). Additionally, the assumption that σ is homogeneous
of degree 0 ensures that θ does not affect the salience of quality.
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would be u(q, p|θ) = θv(q) − p for any (q, p) ∈ M, which we refer to as
the rational case or the rational utility function.
Throughout the paper we consider a monopolistic seller that offers
the menu M = {(q1, p1), . . . , (qk, pk)} to maximize its profit Σki=1ri(pi −
cqi), where c is the marginal cost of production and ri is the measure
of consumers that buy (qi, pi). If a consumer decides to buy nothing and
exits the market, she gets zero utility. In all of the following arguments we
assume there are two types of consumers differing only in their willingness-
to-pay. Specifically, we assume that there are two types of consumers; the
high-type consumers, with WTP θH , and the low-type consumers, with
WTP θL. Of course, θH > θL and there are respectively (1 − m) and
m measure of consumers of each type, where m ∈ (0, 1). An additional
assumption is that δθH > θL, which implies that the high-type consumer
has a higher WTP even in case where she gives smaller weight to quality.
That is, salient-thinking does not result in type reversals. The consumer-
type could be known or unknown to the monopolist, depending on the
context. However, each type’s WTP, θH and θL, and the distribution of
each type is common knowledge.
The monopolist, at the point of designing her bundle, still faces the
usual incentive problems that could rise due to possible asymmetric infor-
mation problems, but the monopolist must also decide, due to the con-
sumers’ salient-thinking behavior, whether or not to add decoy bundles to
the menu to attract the consumers to specific bundles. To take all possible
aspects into consideration, we analyze and compare four types of menus
that the monopolist can provide:
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1. A pooling menu which consists of exactly one bundle that all types
of consumers purchase,
2. A screening menu which consists of exactly two different bundles
with all high-type consumers buying the same bundle and all low-
type consumers buying the other,
3. A pooling menu with decoy which consists of more than one bundle
with all consumers buying the same bundle, and
4. A screening menu with decoy which consists of more than two bun-
dles with all high-type consumers buying the same bundle and all
low-type consumers buying another same bundle, distinct from the
bundle that high-type consumers buy.
In the general model of monopoly with “rational” heterogeneous con-
sumers, a screening menu is more profitable than a pooling menu when-
ever providing such a menu is possible. This is because the monopolist
can freely differentiate quality and prices of the bundles and extract more
from the consumers. However, it turns out that when there are salient-
thinking consumers, an additional good in a menu may affect the salience
of existing bundles and hence the profit of the monopolist is not mono-
tone in the number of her available product lines. Thus, we explore both
pooling and screening menus in the following two sections and compare
the resulting profits and consumer welfares.
Also, while we mainly focus on the situation where the WTP of con-
sumers are privately known, we introduce another case where the mo-
nopolist can distinguish the types of consumers, namely a symmetric in-
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formation case, as a benchmark. With information asymmetry, there is
information rent to the consumers and the monopolist’s profit decreases
generally. We also analyze the effect of salient-thinking on such informa-
tion rent.
3 Optimal Pooling and Screening
In this section, we consider menus that consist of bundles only that are
actually purchased by the consumers. That is, the seller does not offer
decoy bundles. In such context, there are three possible situations de-
pending on the number of bundles offered and the information structure
we can think of: 1) the monopolist offers a single bundle (pooling menu),
2) the monopolist knows the type of each consumer and offers two bun-
dles (screening menu with symmetric information) , or, 3) the monopolist
knows the type of each consumer and offers two bundles (screening menu
with asymmetric information).
To formally write down the seller’s maximization problem, let (qL, pL)
and (qH , pH) denote the bundles that the monopolist desires to sell to the
high-type and low-type consumers, respectively, where pH and pL are not
necessarily different. Write M = {(qL, pL), (qH , pH)}. We consider menus
only with pH ≥ pL (and thus qH ≥ qL). The monopolist maximizes its
profit, m(pL − cqL) + (1−m)(pH − cqH), subject to some combination of
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the following conditions:
IR(L): u(qL, pL|θL) ≥ 0
IR(H): u(qH , pH |θH) ≥ 0
IC(L): u(qL, pL|θL) ≥ u(q, p|θL) ∀(q, p) ∈M
IC(H): u(qH , pH |θH) ≥ u(q, p|θH) ∀(q, p) ∈M
P: (qL, pL) = (qH , pH).
The first two conditions are the participation constraints of the low-type
and high-type consumers; the next two ensure that the consumers indeed
buy the intended bundle. Imposing the last constraint means that the
seller offers only a single bundle. Imposing condition IR and P corre-
sponds to the pooling menu; IR corresponds to the screening menu with
symmetric information; and IR and IC corresponds to the screening menu
with asymmetric information.
3.1 Pooling menu
We begin the analysis by considering the pooling menu. In this case,
we only have a single bundle in the menu, which we denote by (qp, pp).
Since only a single bundle is offered, the bundle is neither quality-salient
nor price-salient, and thus the maximization becomes exactly same with
the rational case. First, note that in optimum IR(L) must bind. If we
suppose to the contrary, there exists ε > 0 such that the monopolist
can raise pp by a small amount ε with the constraints remaining satis-
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fied with higher profits to the seller. Substituting the expression implied
by IR(L) into the objective function and differentiating gives (qp, pp) =
(v′−1(c/θL), θLv(v
′−1(c/θL))). Since the LHS of IR(H) is greater than the
LHS of IR(L), (qp, pp) obviously satisfies IR(H) and thus is indeed the opti-
mal menu. The seller earns a profit of πp = θLv(v
′−1(c/θL))−cv′−1(c/θL).
The low-type consumers earn zero utility and the high-type consumers
earns strictly positive utility. Note that the monopolist faces only rational
consumers and the salient-thinking behavior plays no role here.
3.2 Screening menu under symmetric information
Suppose the consumers observes both bundles offered in the market, but
her choice of purchase is restricted to only one of the two which is des-
ignated by the seller. Then, the consumer, having observed both goods,
evaluates both bundles according to the salient-thinking utility but can
actually buy only the designated bundle. Such situation gives rise to the
screening problem with salient-thinking consumers under symmetric in-
formation. We analyze this symmetric information case as a benchmark
before we proceed to the analysis of screening menus with unknown con-
sumer types. Now, since the monopolist knows each consumer’s type,
she can designate the good the each of the consumers and thus the IC
constraints can be dropped.
It is obvious that with an optimal bundle both of the IR constraints








Thus, the two bundles are both price-salient. This is because the high-type
consumers are willing to pay a relatively larger amount than the increase
in quality due to its high WTP. As a result, the monopolist prefers rather
to discriminate price than to discriminate quality and thus the market
becomes price-salient. Now, by substituting the two binding constraints
























































Note that a low type consumer buys a bundle with lower quality and price
than she does in the pooling case; a high type consumer buys a bundle
with higher quality and price.
3.3 Screening menu under asymmetric information
A more realistic situation is one where the monopolist does not know
each consumer’s type so that she must consider the consumers’ incentive
compatibility constraints. Since the menu consists of only two bundles,
(qL, pL) and (qH , pH), it is straightforward that σ(vL, v̄) ≥ σ(pL, p̄) if and
only if σ(vH , v̄) ≥ σ(pH , p̄). Thus, we only need to consider the cases in
which the salient attributes of both bundles are the same, and in each case
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the IC constraint becomes
IC(L): θLvL − δpL ≥ θLvH − δpH
IC(H): θHvH − δpH ≥ θHvL − δpL
when the bundles are quality-salient,
IC(L): δθLvL − pL ≥ δθLvH − pH
IC(H): δθHvH − pH ≥ δθHvL − pL
when the bundles are price-salient, and
IC(L): θLvL − pL ≥ θLvH − pH
IC(H): θHvH − pH ≥ θHvL − pL
when neither of the attributes are salient. In all three cases, it is straight-
forward to show that IC(H) and IR(H) imply IR(L).
Proposition 1. If m > 1 − θL/θH5, a solution menu of the screening




















Moreover, both bundles in the menu are price salient and the optimal
5The higher quality the low-type consumers are provided with, the more incentive
exists for the high-type consumers to deviate from their target bundle. Thus, if there
are few low-type consumers, then the monopolist will give up making a profit from them
and set both quality and price to zero, which is not an interesting case.
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screening menu does not necessarily yield higher profits than the optimal
pooling menu.
Proof. Appendix A.1
If the monopolist can compose a menu which separates the consumers
according to their types, it necessarily consists of the bundles that are
price-salient. In contrast with the standard result of a screening model,
the optimal pooling menu can be more profitable to the monopolist than
the screening menu. This is because when δ is sufficiently small and the
consumers’ utility from quality is minute with price-salient bundles, the
benefit from the separation will be outweighed by the loss from consumers’
insensitivity to the quality of products. To be concrete, as is shown in the
proof of Proposition 1, by composing a pooling menu the monopolist can
extract more especially from the low-type consumers.
4 Optimal Menus with Decoy Bundles
While we have considered menus that consist only of bundles that will
actually be sold in equilibrium, including additional bundles to the menu,
even though it may not sell, may affect consumer choice due to the salient-
thinking behavior of the consumers. Hence, there could be a possibility
that the seller adds decoy bundles – those included in the menu not in-
tended to sell but to attract consumers to the target bundles – in pursuit
of higher profit. In this section, we derive the optimal menus that include
decoy bundles a monopolist offers under the three situations of the earlier
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sector. Throughout the section, we refer to bundles intended to sell as
target bundles, and the all other bundles are referred to as decoy bundles.
4.1 Pooling menu with decoy
First, we begin with the simpler case where the monopolist can offer a
single target bundle with some additional k > 0 bundles of decoy. To
write down the maximization problem formally, again let (qs, ps) be the
target bundle, and let M\{(qs, ps)} = {(q1, p1), . . . , (qk, pk)}. Then, the




s.t. IR(L): u(qs, ps|θL) ≥ 0
IR(H): u(qs, ps|θH) ≥ 0(2)
IC(L): u(qs, ps|θL) ≥ u(qi, pi|θL) ∀i
IC(H): u(qs, ps|θH) ≥ u(qi, pi|θH) ∀i.
Since we are considering a pooling menu, only one bundle will be sold
in the equilibrium. However, with the additional bundles in the menu, the
monopolist may be able to sell a bundle that was previously not possible
to do so or also it can get higher prices relative to quality by distracting
the consumers from price and making them focus on quality (i.e. by
making the target bundle quality-salient.) A quick guess is that making
the target bundle quality-salient would give more profit to the monopolist
because then the consumer does not care much about the price so making
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it possible for the monopolist to extract a higher price from the consumer.
The following lemma shows that this is indeed the case.










k) is a solution to the max-




Lemma 1 ensures that it is sufficient to consider only menus that render
the target bundle quality-salient. Now, first consider the relatively simple
case with k = 1. We write (qd, pd) instead of (q1, p1) to emphasize that this
bundle is a decoy. What the monopolist wants to do is to make the target
bundle quality-salient using the decoy bundle. However, the monopolist
will provide a decoy bundle if doing so gives more profit than just offering a
single bundle. The following proposition shows that an appropriate decoy
bundle exists and adding it to the menu increases the firm’s profit.
Proposition 2. Consider the monopolist’s maximization problem (2) with
k = 1. Then, a solution menu exists, and has the form
(q̃p, p̃p) = (v′−1(δc/θL), θLv(v
′−1(δc/θL))/δ).




Now we know that the monopolist can make an improvement on its
profit by using a single decoy. Then, a natural question rises in mind: can
the monopolist improve even more by using multiple decoys? However,
the following remark shows that this is not the case; one decoy bundle is
sufficient to attain the maximal profit in giving a pooling menu.
Remark. The monopolist has no incentive to offer more than one decoy
bundle.
Proof. The bundle (q̃p, p̃p) in Proposition 2 maximizes the monopolist’s
profit with IC excluded from the constraint and thus gives (weakly) greater
profit than any other solution of the maximization problem (2). However,
we have shown that (q̃p, p̃p) can be supported as the target bundle of
a solution with a single appropriate decoy bundle. Hence, there is no
additional gain from using more than one decoy bundles.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we have seen that the optimal decoy
bundle features lower price and quality than the target bundle. However,
this does not mean that bundles with higher price and quality than the
target bundle cannot be used as decoy bundles. What it means is that if
we are to attain the maximum profit under pooling menus with a single
decoy, we must use bundles with lower price and quality. However, if we
use more than one decoy bundle, we can also include bundles with high
price and quality in the menu.
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4.2 Screening menu with decoy under symmetric informa-
tion
When the monopolist provides two different bundles for each type of con-
sumers, her profit can be improved by adding a decoy bundle as in the
pooling menu case. The maximization problem is
max
(pL,qL),(pH ,qH),(p1,q1),...,(pk,qk),k
m(pL − cqL) + (1−m)(pH − cqH)
s.t. IR(L): u(pL, qL|θL) ≥ 0(3)
IR(H): u(pH , qH |θH) ≥ 0
The absence of the IC constraints enables the monopolist to extract
surplus as if there are two separate markets. Thus, Lemma 1 implies that
the profit is maximized only if the target bundles to sell are both quality-







readily derived in a similar way as in subsection 3.2. The only difference
is that the participation constraints for the consumers are θiv(qi) = δpi
for i = L,H instead of δθiv(qi) = pi, reflecting the quality-salience of the




































Making the consumers pay more attention to the quality, the monopolist
is able to sell the goods of higher quality at even higher prices. In this
case, too, a single decoy bundle is enough and the construction of it is as
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follows. First, we take v̄ > δp̃sH/θL and p̄ = p̃
s





the same price as the average price, so it is clearly quality-salient. Also,
the quality-price ratio of the bundle for the low-type consumers is lower
than that of the average bundle, i.e., (q̄, p̄), and thus the quality becomes
salient. Moreover, such average quality and price can be always attained
by introducing a product which features higher quality and price than
those of the target bundles.
4.3 Screening menu with decoy under asymmetric infor-
mation
Now, we finally turn to the most complicated case where there is asym-
metric information on consumer types and also the monopolist can add
decoy bundles to the menu. Since the monopolist does not know each
consumer’s type, she must consider two additional incentive constraints:
IC(L): u(qL, pL|θL) ≥ u(qi, pi|θL) ∀i
IC(H): u(qH , pH |θH) ≥ u(qi, pi|θH) ∀i.
We refer to the maximization problem resulting from adding the two IC
constraints to (3) as (3)′. Before the monopolist sets the quality and the
price of additional bundles, she has to decide which attribute of her target
bundles to be salient. Again, due to the following Lemma, a menu with
quality-salient target bundles is most profitable to the monopolist.
Lemma 2. When offering a menu, suppose that the monopolist can decide
which attributes of the target bundles to be salient regardless of their actual
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salience. Under such situation, letM be a menu that satisfies both IR and
IC and maximizes the monopolist’s profit. Then, the target bundles of M
must be quality salient.
Proof. Appendix A.4
Before composing a full menu including decoy bundles, the monopolist




m(pL − cqL) + (1−m)(pH − cqH)
s.t. θiv(qi)− δpi ≥ 0 for i = L,H(4)
θiv(qi)− δpi ≥ θiv(qj)− δpj for i, j = L,H, i 6= j .





















Both target bundles are price-salient if the monopolist gives a menu com-
prised of them only as shown in section 3.3, which implies that the actual
incentive constraints are different from those specified in (4). Hence, it
is impossible for the monopolist to sell the optimal target bundles by of-
fering a menu consisting of only the two. To be concrete, the bundle
(q̃aL, p̃
a
L) makes the low-type consumers break even if it is quality-salient,
but the consumers will leave the market with buying nothing if they pay
more attention to the price than the quality. However, if proper decoy
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bundles are added to the menu, the target bundles become quality-salient
and thus the monopolist can achieve the desired maximum profit. The
following Proposition ensures that it is always possible to design such a
menu.
Proposition 3. There always exists a finite set of decoy bundles that
composes a solution of the maximization problem (3)′ when combined with
{(q̃aL, p̃aL), (q̃aH , p̃aH)}.
Proof. Appendix A.5
While it was sufficient to include a single decoy bundle in the menu to
achieve maximum profit in pooling or screening with symmetric informa-
tion cases, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that a single decoy bundle may
not be enough for some values of the parameters δ, c, and m. However,
since providing an additional bundle that will not be sold still incurs some
cost in reality, such menus that include numerous decoy bundles may not
be profitable. Nonetheless, the monopolist can earn higher profits than
the no-decoy screening case even by including only a single decoy bundle
due to the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. There always exists a screening menu with only a single
decoy that yields more profit to the monopolist than the optimal screening
menu with no decoys does.
Proof. Appendix A.6
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5 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
In this section, we compare the menus we have solved in the former sections
in two aspects. Specifically, we compare the monopolist’s profit between
the resulting menus, and then also the consumers’ utility under the menus.
Moreover, we conclude with some suggestions on possible extensions of the
paper.
5.1 Monopolist profit
In Sections 3 and 4, we have shown that adding decoys generally increases
the monopolist’s profit. Here, we show how such difference depends on
the salience parameter, δ. Also, by comparing the optimal profits when
a monopolist uses decoys under asymmetric information with the optimal
profits when she is not allowed to use decoys under symmetric information,
we examine whether the gains from exploiting consumers’ salient-thinking
behavior can outweigh the information rent.
An intuitive explanation for our results is that when consumers are
significantly concerned with the salience of attributes, the monopolist can
manipulate the consumers’ perception of items by diversifying their prod-
ucts. In fact, when such salient-thinking is more severe, the value of
manipulation increases. In the case of screening under information asym-
metry, the monopolist considers the maximization problem
max
qL,qH
α(θL − (1−m)θH)v(qL)−mcqL + α(1−m)θHv(qH)− (1−m)cqH ,
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where α is δ if a decoy bundle is not allowed and hence the bundles are
price-salient, and α is 1/δ if the monopolist intends to compose a menu
with quality-salient target bundles. Clearly, the difference between profits
is bigger when δ is small, which implies little attention of consumers to
the less salient attribute. In such a case, the consumers who face quality
salient bundles will think that how much they pay is insignificant. This
kind of behavior may harm the consumers and we will discuss this aspect
in subsection 5.2.
It also turns out that by using decoy bundles the monopolist is able
to overcome her disadvantage due to information asymmetry. It is easily
verified that the profit of the monopolist is higher under symmetric infor-
mation than when the types of consumers are not known to her. A more
interesting issue is how much the monopolist can extract from consumers’
salient-thinking, especially in comparison with the magnitude of the in-
formation rent. The comparison of two profits, πs and π̃a, leads us to the
conclusion that the benefit from using decoys, if δ is small, may override
the value of acquiring information. The effect of the salient-thinking is
twofold. First, without consumers’ consideration of salience, the monopo-
list should provide lower quality for the low-type consumers to resolve the
incentive problem between two types of consumers. In contrast, if salient-
thinking is prevalent, the seller provides more quality and sets higher price
so that she can yield more profit from the low-type consumers. But then
again, an increased provision of quality to the low-type forces the monop-
olist to cut the price for the high-type to the extent that the incentive
constraints remain satisfied. However, the monopolist’s ability to skim
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money out of the consumers who are obsessed with quality dominates the
pressure of the incentive problem, and more profit can be attained from
the high-type consumers, too.
5.2 Consumer utility
Now, we turn our attention to the consumers and evaluate their utility
under the menus in interest. However, since the utility itself depends
on the offered menu, it is meaningless to directly compare the consumer
utilities evaluated under the distinct menus. Note that an identical bundle
can be price salient under some menu and quality salient in some other
menu so that the utility is different under each menu. If we simply compare
the utilities resulting from each situation, we would arrive at a awkward
conclusion that such bundle is strictly better than itself. Hence, what we
compare here is the rational case utility of the bundles the consumer buys
in each of the cases. Considering salient-thinking as some biased behavior
a consumer exhibits in the market at the timing of purchasing, we could
think of the rational utility as the actual realized utility after the bias is
resolved at some point after the purchase.
It is rather obvious that low-type consumers are worse off when the
monopolist introduces decoy bundles to make the target bundle quality-
salient. Regardless of whether a consumer is given a pooling or a screening
menu, she gets zero utility if she buys the quality-salient bundle. This
implies that she would never buy it if she had put the same weight on the
two attributes, or considered rational utility. On the contrary, the change
in the high-type consumer’s utility is indeterminate. If we compare the
23
screening cases with and without decoy bundles, we have
u(q̃aH , p̃
a













The first term is negative, where the first term in the bracket represents
the loss from paying excessively for a quality-salient good and the second
term in the bracket represents foregone benefit from caring much about
prices when there is no decoy. However, the second term which is re-
lated to the high-type consumer’s benefit from information asymmetry
is strictly positive. Thus, the direction of change in the high-type con-
sumer’s utility will be determined depending on the relative magnitude of
the two effects. Nevertheless, by examining the difference of her utilities
in symmetric information cases with and without decoys, we can explicitly
see the negative pure effect of decoy bundles on the welfare of high-type
consumers, as is the case with the low-type ones.
5.3 Possible extensions
In this paper, we have analyzed the behavior of a monopolist facing two
types of salient-thinking consumers. However, there are still many in-
teresting research questions pending regarding the market with salient-
thinking consumer types. First of all, while we only briefly discuss the
effect of cost that may incur due to adding new bundles to the menu,
it would be more interesting if such cost is explicitly modelled in to the
monopolist’s problem. Secondly, competition could be introduced instead
of assuming a monopolistic seller. It would be interesting to see whether
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competing firms also have an incentive to offer decoy bundles or whether
a firm with the option to offer decoy bundles wins the market. Bordalo,
Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013b) introduced competition in a market with
homogeneous salient-thinking consumers with firms offering only target
bundles, which would be a nice starting point. Lastly, assuming that the
consumers’ type space is a continuum may provide us with new intuitions
which were not apparent with only two types of consumers.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1: When quality is the salient attribute, we have
δ
θH







The first two inequalities come from the IC constraints and the last one
from the IR(L) constraint. However, it is implied by the inequalities above
that vL/pL ≥ vH/pH and hence that quality is not salient. Thus, if the
monopolist provides quality-salient bundles, then the incentive constraints
fail to hold and the desired screening cannot occur.
Case 2: In the case where the bundles are price-salient, the two IC
constraints are summarized as follows:
1
δθH





Since the IR(L) is binding at the solution, pL = δθLvL. Also, the con-
straint IC(H), which is represented by the first inequality above, must
bind since, otherwise, the monopolist is able to raise the price pH without
varying qH and extract more money from the high-type consumers. Thus,


















Case 3: When both attributes are equally salient, it holds that vH/pH =
vL/pL = (vH − vL)/(pH − pL). Since the IC constraints become
1
θH





and θLvL ≥ pL from IR(L), we obtain pL = θLvL and pH = θLvH . Thus,
the maximization problem is
max
(qL,qH)
m(θLv(qL)− cqL) + (1−m)(θLv(qH)− cqH) ,
and the optimal quality provision is v′−1(c/θL) for both types, which is
equivalent to that of the optimal pooling menu.
Hence, qaL and q
a
H with the corresponding prices consist the optimal
screening menu. However, the profit from this menu is not necessarily
higher than that from the optimal pooling menu. The difference between
the profits from the two menus are


















































Let f(x, y) := v(v′−1(x)) − yv′−1(x) and g(x) := f(x, x) = v(v′−1(x)) −
xv′−1(x). Then, we can rewrite the difference as follows:


























Since ∂f/∂x(x, y) = (x − y)(v′−1)′(x), f(x, y) is maximized at x = y,
given y. Thus, the first part of the difference is positive. On the contrary,
g′(x) = −v′−1(x) < 0 and the second part is positive by the assumption
that δθH > θL. Thus, if m is near 1 or if δ is sufficiently small, then π
p is
greater than πa.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we argue that IR(L) must bind. Suppose otherwise. Observing that
the LHS of IC(H) is always greater than the LHS of IC(L), these exists a
positive number ε > 0 such that the new set of bundles obtained by raising
all p∗s and p
∗
i (i = 1, . . . , k) by the same amount ε violate none of the
constraints. However, the monopolist’s profit increases in this case, which
contradicts with the fact that the given bundle was optimal. Therefore,













θLv(q)− cq, for α ∈ [−1, 1] .
Then, π(−1) and π(1) are the maximized profits of the seller when the
solution (q∗s , p
∗
s) is price-salient and quality-salient, respectively. By the
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envelope theorem, we have
π′(α) =
2(1− δ)(1 + δ)(
(1 + δ)− (1− δ)α
)2 θLv(q∗s(α)) > 0 .
Therefore, (q∗s , p
∗
s) is quality-salient.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
By Lemma 1, we know that quality must be the salient attribute under the
optimal menu and thus we may include σ(v(qs), v̄) > σ(ps, p̄) as an addi-
tional constraint. Under such additional constraint, IR and IC conditions
boil down to the following simpler conditions:
IR(L): θLv(qs) = δps
IR(H): θHv(qs) ≥ δps
IC(L): θLv(qs)− δps ≥ θLv(qd)− δpd
IC(H): θHv(qs)− δps ≥ θHv(qd)− δpd
Since IR(L) implies IR(H), we need not consider the latter. From IR(L) we
obtain an expression of ps as a function of qs. Substituting this expression
in the objective function and differentiating with respect to qs, we obtain
the first-order condition for the maximization problem without the IC con-
straints: q̃p = v′−1(δc/θL). Denoting p̃
p = (θL/δ)v(v
′−1(δc/θL)), (q̃s, p̃s) is
the solution to the maximization without the IC constraint. Hence, if we
find (qd, pd) such that {(q̃p, p̃p), (qd, pd)} satisfies IC and quality-salience
of (q̃p, p̃p), then {(q̃p, p̃p), (qd, pd)} would be a solution to the given maxi-
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mization problem.









If this condition holds, we can verify that v(q̃p)/p̃p > v(qd)/pd and that
(q̃p, p̃p) is quality-salient. Thus, for any qd with v(qd) < v(q̃
p)pd/p̃
p, (qd, pd)
is a decoy bundle which supports (q̃p, p̃p) as a target bundle.









which implies v(q̃p)/p̃p = δ/θL > v(qd)/pd and that the bundle (q̃
p, p̃p) is
price-salient. It is immidiate from Lemma 1 that the menu {(q̃p, p̃p), (qd, pd)}
makes more profit than the menu {(qp, pp)}.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Note that, for any given salience imposed on bundles, if a menu {(q̂L, p̂L), (q̂H , p̂H)}
with q̂H > q̂L > 0 and p̂H > p̂L maximizes the profit, then the constraints
IR(L) and IC(H) must be binding at {(q̂L, p̂L), (q̂H , p̂H)}.
Case 1: Suppose that the salient attributes of both bundles in the menu
are the same, but that they are not quality-salient. Due to the two binding
incentive constraints, we have the following maximization problems:
max
qL,qH
α(θL − (1−m)θH)v(qL)−mcqL + α(1−m)θHv(qH)− (1−m)cqH ,
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where α = δ or 1. The problem is for the case where the bundles are price-
salient, if α = δ, and for the case where the attributes are equally salient,
if α = 1. In any case, the maximized value is smaller than that in the case
where α = 1/δ, that is, the case where the bundles are quality-salient,
since the coefficients of v(qL) and v(qH) are both positive and increasing
in α.
In the case 2 and 3, we use proofs by contradiction. Suppose that
{(q̂L, p̂L), (q̂H , p̂H)} is the menu which maximizes the monopolist’s profit.
Case 2: Consider the three cases where the quality of (q̂H , p̂H) is
relatively more salient than the quality of (q̂L, p̂L) is. Without loss of
generality 6, we assume that (q̂H , p̂H) is quality-salient while (q̂L, p̂L) is
price-salient. Then, we have
θH v̂H − δp̂H = δθH v̂L − p̂L
θLv̂H − δp̂H < 0
δθLv̂L − p̂L = 0 .
Each of the conditions comes from IC(H), IC(L), and IR(L). Let the price-








L − δp′L = 0, and θHv′L − δp′L = δθH v̂L − p̂L .
6If (q̂H , p̂H) is equally-salient and (q̂L, p̂L) is price-salient, then, we can first make
both of them equally-salient and then apply the argument in the case 1 to show that
the profit can be increased further.
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Thus, the low-type consumers prefer the new bundle to (q̂H , p̂H), while
the high-type buyers are indifferent between them. Also, we have from
the equations above that
v′L = δv̂L < v̂L, and p
′
L = θLv̂L > δθLv̂L = p̂L .
Thus, the monopolist can increase her profit by substituting a quality-
salient bundle with lower quality and higher price.
Case 3: Consider the three cases where the price of (q̂H , p̂H) is rela-
tively more salient than the price of (q̂L, p̂L) is. Without loss of generality,
we assume that (q̂H , p̂H) is price-salient while (q̂L, p̂L) is quality-salient.
Then, as in the case 2, from the incentive constraints we have
δθH v̂H − p̂H = θH v̂L − δp̂L
δθLv̂H − p̂H < 0
θLv̂L − δp̂L = 0 .
We raise the price of the bundle for the high-type consumers. So, replace





θH v̂H − δp′′H = θH v̂L − δp̂L.
Thus, the high-type consumers are indifferent between the new bundle and
the existing bundle for the low-type buyers. Also, the low-type consumers
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In other words, the monopolist’s profit can be increased by substituting
a quality salient bundle for the high-type consumers with a higher price
and the same quality.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
This proof is by construction. Let {(q1, p1), . . . , (qk, pk)} be the set of
decoy bundles where k, the number of bundles, will be fixed later. Let










i=1 vi. We must find the
values of p̄ and v̄ such that the target bundles become quality-salient
and at the same time they are preferred to all the decoy bundles by the
corresponding types of buyers. We will find p̄ and v̄ with p̄ < p̃aL and
v̄ < ṽaL. Since σ(v, v̄) > σ(p, p̄) if and only if v/p > v̄/p̄ when v > v̄ and
p > p̄, both of the target bundles are quality-salient if ṽai /p̃
a
i > v̄/p̄ for






Fix (v̄, p̄) ∈ D ≡ {(v, p) : p > p̃aHv/ṽaH , 0 < p < p̃aL , v > 0}. Then
it is always possible to take sufficiently many points (v1, p1), . . . , (vk, pk)
near (v̄, p̄) to set the actual average quality and price equal to (v̄, p̄). The
bundles (q1, p1), . . . , (qk, pk) corresponding to the points are the desired
decoy bundles. Now it remains to check if there is no incentive for buyers
to select the decoy bundles rather than the target bundles. Since the
consumers’ indifference curves at their target bundles are θHv − δp =
θH ṽ
a
L − δp̃aL(> 0) and θLv − δp = 0, respectively, every point in D lies
above both of the two curves. Thus, it is straightforward that the decoy
bundles are inferior to the target bundles, regardless of whether they are
quality-salient or price-salient.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the optimal screening menu {(qaL, paL), (qaH , paH)} without a de-
coy bundle which is derived in section 3.3. We will design a new menu
{(qaL, paL), (qaH , p′H), (qd, pd)} which satisfies the incentive constraints for
consumers and that increases the monopolist’s profit. Suppose θLv
a
H/δ >




H/δ. Also, it is possible to take a point (v̄, p̄) such
that
(5) p′H > p̄, v
a




H < v̄p̄, and
2v̄ − (vaL + vaH)





We select (qd, pd) so that the average quality and salient of the desired
menu become v̄ and p̄. The first three conditions ensure that (qaH , p
′
H) is
quality-salient, and the fourth that (qaL, p
a
L) and (qd, pd) are price-salient.
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Now we verify that the incentive constraints hold. First, (qaH , p
′
H) is strictly
preferred to (qaL, p
a
L) by the high-type consumers since
u(qaH , p
′
H | θH)− u(qaL, paL| θH)
= (θHv
a
H − δθLvaH/δ)− (δθHvaL − paL)
= (θH − θL)vaH − (δθHvaL − δθLvaL) (∵ IR(L) is binding at (qaL, paL))
= (θH − θL)(vaH − δvaL) > 0 .
Also, the fourth condition in (5) ensures that the high-type consumers
strictly prefer (qaL, p
a
L) to (qd, pd). When it comes to the incentive compat-
ibility constraints for the low-type consumers, it should be noted that
u(qaL, p
a
L| θL) = u(qaH , p′H | θL) = 0 ,
and hence the consumers are indifferent between the two bundles. More-
over, the fourth condition in (5) again guarantees that the decoy bundle
(qd, pd) will not be chosen by the low-type buyers.
Now suppose θLvH/δ ≤ paH . Then, it is sufficient for the monopolist
to raise the price of the high-type bundle slightly. So, let p′H = p
a
H + ε for
some small ε > 0. Similarly, we can take a point (v̄, p̄) which satisfies the
condition (5). Then, for each of the three bundles, the salient attribute
is given as before. Now we check if the incentive constraints hold. Note
that the decoy bundle is less preferred to the target bundles for each type
by the corresponding consumers due to the last condition in (5). The
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H | θH)− u(qaL, paL| θH)
= u(qaH , p
′
H | θH)− u(qaH , paH | θH) (∵ IC(H) is binding at (qaL, paL) and (qaH , paH).)
= (θHv
a
H − δ(paH + ε))− (δθHvaH − paH) > 0 for sufficiently small ε .
Also, the target bundle (qaL, p
a




H | θH) = θLvaH − δp′H < θLvaH − δ(θLvaH/δ) = 0 = u(qaL, paL| θL) .
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국문초록
본고에서는 주어진 상품의 여러 성질 중 특히 도드라지는
성질에 더욱 주목하는 소비자들이 산재해 있는 시장에서 독점
공급자가 상품군을 어떻게 구성할 것인가의 문제에 대해
이론적으로 분석한다. 위와 같은 경향을 갖는 소비자들을
‘salient-thinking하다’고 일컫는데, 구체적으로 Bordalo, Gennaioli,
and Shleifer (2013b)에서 소개한 효용함수를 차용함으로써
소비자들의 이러한 행동을 모형에 반영한다. 또한, 지불의사가
다른 소비자의 존재를 가정함으로써 전통적인 정보 비대칭의
문제도 함께 다룬다. 본고에서는 먼저 이러한 시장에서 독점
공급자가 직면하는 선별(screening) 문제를 풂으로써 최적 선별
(optimal screening)을 위해 독점 공급자는 가격보다는 질을 더욱
도드라져 보이게 하는 상품군을 구성한다는 것을 보인다.
다음으로, 독점 공급자가 실제로 팔 의도는 없지만 실제로 팔려는
상품의 특정 특성(여기서는 가격 또는 품질)을 도드라지게 하기
위해 시장에 상품을 낼 수 있는 경우를 분석하는데, 이와 같은
상품을 미끼상품 (decoy bundle)이라 일컫는다. 전통적인 합리적
소비자 모형 하에서는 이러한 미끼상품이 아무런 역할을 하지
못하지만, 본고의 모형에서는 소비자들이 본인이 구매하는
상품뿐만 아니라 구매하지 않는 다른 상품들 역시 효용에 영향을
끼치므로 이러한 미끼상품을 적절히 구성할 유인을 독점 공급자가
가질 것으로 생각해 볼 있다. 실제 모형을 풀어보면, 독점
공급자는 미끼상품들을 적절히 구성해서 실제로 팔려는 상품의
품질을 가격보다 더욱 도드라지게 만듦으로써 소비자들에게서
높은 가격을 받아내고 실제로 더 높은 이윤을 누릴 수 있음을 알
수 있고, 더 나아가 소비자는 이로 인해 후생감소를 겪는 것 역시
보일 수 있다.
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